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The following text opened the conference, “The Concept of Immanence in Philosophy and the Arts”, 
held in Vienna in May 2016. It is a reader consisting of key passages on immanence by Gilles 
Deleuze, Baruch de Spinoza, Giorgio Agamben, Henri Bergson, François Laruelle, Antonin Artaud 
and Friedrich Nietzsche. The reader was put together by Arno Böhler and Elisabeth Schäfer, and a 
collage of its content arranged by Susanne Valerie Granzer, who read out these text fragments at 
the start of the conference. Her reading was sporadically interrupted by Alice Lagaay, whose 
comments served to draw lines of connection between the dense theoretical texts and the 
performative immanent context in which they were being read and digested—the context of the 
conference. We present here the readings and their lighthearted—and at times deadly serious—
commentary as performed. Readers are invited to imagine and re-enact the live-ness of this event, 
letting their own comments, questions and musings interrupt the proposed interruptions of 
reading. 
Listen to this text: 
 https://soundcloud.com/performancephilosophy/reading-immanence 
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1. Immanence in Deleuze 
S.V.G.: “Can the entire history of philosophy be 
presented from the viewpoint of the instituting 
of a plane of immanence?” (Deleuze 1994a, 44) 
“[P]ure immanence requires as a principle the 
equality of being, or the positing of equal 
Being: not only is being equal in itself, but it is 
seen to be equally present in all beings.” 
(Deleuze 1990, 173) 
“Being is said in a single and same sense of 
everything of which it is said, but that of which 
it is said differs: it is said of difference itself.” 
(Deleuze 1994b, 36) 
A. L.: And so it has taken us a good while to get 
here. An entire history, to “institute” the plane 
of immanence. Are we there yet? Or is it not 
always at best a moving towards immanence? 
(The question of time is one we will no doubt 
return to). And would we really want to have 
arrived there? And please excuse my naivety, 
or the childish unreservedness of this mind 
that tends to work by means of simple 
association (as opposed to the logic of 
pragmatism), but—here it comes—what indeed 
of the relation between immanence and the 
institution(s)? Can an institution—like the 
university, or an academy—ever thrive on 
immanence?  
That’s it, I’ve said it—that was quick! The 
question now hangs in the air like a lost balloon 
at a birthday party. It will hover above us, 
accompany us as we move from room to room. 
Will it slowly deflate? Or will someone get a 
stick and pop it? (The laws of physics do still 
apply to immanence, right?) 
But seriously, is an institution like the university 
not necessarily driven, poised towards, and 
fuelled precisely by the ‘other’ of immanence? 
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Not the flat ontological plane of facticity, not 
the equality of beings, but the crystalline 
promise of the star position, the tip of the 
pyramid, or at least the imagination thereof, in 
other words, based on the acceptance of 
hierarchy? Are there hierarchies within the 
plane of immanence? (I warned Elisabeth that I 
was going to have to be bold and unguarded in 
the expression of my ignorant wonder.) 
S.V.G.: “Expression is on the one hand an 
explication, an unfolding of what expresses 
itself, the One manifesting itself in the Many 
[…]. Its multiple expression, on the other hand, 
involves Unity. The One remains involved in 
what expresses it, imprinted in what unfolds it, 
immanent in whatever manifests it […].” 
(Deleuze 1990, 16) 
A.L.: So this is immanence. Not just the reading 
and debating of discourses on immanence. But 
the expression—here and now—of the struggle 
to explain it. 
S.V.G.: “[Artaud] knows that thinking is not 
innate, but must be engendered in thought. He 
knows that the problem is not to direct or 
methodically apply a thought which pre-exists 
in principle and in nature, but to bring into 
being that which does not yet exist (there is no 
other work, all the rest is arbitrary, mere 
decoration).” (Deleuze 1994b, 147) 
A.L.: “To bring into being that which does not 
yet exist”… Here we touch on the true serious 
heart of the P-word. In performance, through 
performativity, world is not repeated so much 
as engendered. Which brings me to ask the 
obvious question, one that I would like us to try 
and articulate a response to here: How, or in 
what ways and with what particular consequence, 
is the question of immanence particularly 
pertinent to the task of the artist philosopher, or 
particularly pertinent to the realm of Performance 
Philosophy? Who can say this? 
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S.V.G.: “Perhaps this is the supreme act of 
philosophy: not so much to think THE plane of 
immanence as to show that it is there, 
unthought in every plane, and to think it in this 
way as the outside and inside of thought, as the 
not-external outside and the not-internal 
inside—that which cannot be thought and yet 
must be thought […].” (Deleuze 1994a, 59–60) 
A.L.: Oh boy, I should have done my homework! 
I should have taken more time to prepare. Now 
it is what it is. And I don’t mean to be facetious, 
but if only I knew more than I do, if I’d learnt 
more, worked harder, if I were cleverer, if I’d sat 
up late for several nights and not just one. 
Would all that extra knowledge weigh more—
in terms of immanence—than the pathetic little 
that my tired mind is able to offer up 
spontaneously now? Does immanence do 
away with an ethics of labour? (Or I am barking 
up the wrong tree, on another plane, planes, 
lines in the sky—a leitmotiv of my current 
existence.) My existence? Is who I am and what 
I bring in terms of experience, or personality, 
or bewilderment, relevant to the realm of 
immanence? 
S.V.G.: “Spinoza was the philosopher who knew 
full well that immanence was only immanent to 
itself and therefore that it was a plane 
traversed by movements of the infinite, filled 
with intensive ordinates. He is therefore the 
prince of philosophers.” (Deleuze 1994a, 48) 
A.L.: So much for immanence and hierarchies, 
she thinks… & who, may I ask, is the king? 
S.V.G.: “Immanence is immanent only to itself 
and consequently captures everything, 
absorbs All-One, and leaves nothing remaining 
to which it could be immanent. In any case, 
whenever immanence is interpreted as 
immanent to Something, we can be sure that 
this Something reintroduces the transcendent.” 
(Deleuze 1994a, 45) 
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A.L.: So in order to explore this immanence, we 
must not place ourselves outside it, there must 
be no privileged perspective. We are part of it, 
and everything around us is part of us. Does 
this mean that in immanence all difference is 
suspended? And that I can’t even appeal to an 
expert to help explain? (Are there experts in 
immanence or do we all have equal access? 
Again: what do I have to do to understand 
more?)  
Reading these fragments of text I have been 
struck by how hard it is to make sense of 
fragments, there’s a sort of violence at work in 
having things ripped from their context. And 
yet at the same time there would seem to be a 
certain resonance, a certain appropriateness 
or accordance, between the fragmentary and 
the immanent. Or is this where a dramatic 
“suspension of disbelief” is required? 
 On another note, it has also been noticeable, 
and worthy of reflection perhaps, that at times 
there seems to be an immediate way into these 
texts, they make intuitive sense, yet at other 
times, it all seems totally opaque and I am 
locked out. And I have not yet been able to 
decipher what conditions the difference, the 
switch; why one moment it all feels so clear, 
accessible and acceptable, obvious even, but 
on a different day, in a different mood, there’s 
no way in. Is it a secret language? Or is it like 
Poe’s purloined letter, or Derrida’s secret that 
is not hidden, that is there for everyone to see, 
whoever knows how not to look, that is. But 
how to look? That is the question! 
S.V.G.: “When immanence is no longer 
immanent to something other than itself it is 
possible to speak of a plane of immanence. 
Such a plane is perhaps a radical empiricism 
[…].” (Deleuze 1994a, 47) 
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A.L.: Radical empiricism, in the sense that it can 
be perceived by means of the body? But not by 
my or your or anyone’s particular body, 
correct? For that would make it immanent to 
something other than itself. Radical 
empiricism, in the sense that immanence 
perceives itself, one could almost say, thinks 
itself…. but doesn’t that sound very much like 
Aristotle’s unmoved mover, the thought that 
thinks itself thinking? I fear we’re really going to 
have to try to spell out this central relation 
between immanence and transcendence. My 
hunch is that one is not erased so easily by the 
other, and this immanence that perceives itself 
and is for no other, where does it leave ‘me’ in 
the picture? Or does immanence necessarily go 
hand in hand with a dissolution of subjectivity? 
(Who dareth be so bold as to state so?) 
S.V.G.: “[Immanence] is the nonthought within 
thought. It is the base of all planes, immanent 
to every thinkable plane that does not succeed 
in thinking it. It is the most intimate within 
thought and yet the absolute outside—an 
outside more distant than any external world 
because it is an inside deeper than any internal 
world: it is immanence, ‘intimacy as the 
Outside, the exterior become the intrusion that 
stifles, and the reversal of both the one and the 
other’ […].” (Deleuze 1994a, 59) 
 “‘Spinoza and us’—this phrase could mean 
many things, but among other things, it means 
‘us in the middle of Spinoza.’ To try to perceive 
and to understand Spinoza by way of the 
middle. Generally one begins with the first 
principle of a philosopher. But what counts is 
also the third, the fourth, or the fifth principle. 
(A.L.: Did I miss the second?) 
Everyone knows the first principle of Spinoza: 
one substance for all the attributes. But we also 
know the third, fourth, or fifth principle: one 
Nature for all bodies, one Nature for all 
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individuals, a Nature that is itself an individual 
varying in an infinite number of ways. What is 
involved is no longer the affirmation of a single 
substance, but rather the laying out of a 
common plane of immanence on which all 
bodies, all minds, and all individuals are 
situated. This plane of immanence or 
consistency is a plan, but not in the sense of a 
mental design, a project, a program; it is a plan 
in the geometric sense: a section, an 
intersection, a diagram.* Thus, to be in the 
middle of Spinoza is to be on this modal plane, 
or rather to install oneself on this plane—which 
implies a mode of living, a way of life. What is 
this plane and how does one construct it? For 
at the same it is fully a plane of immanence, 
and yet it has to be constructed if one is to live 
in a Spinozist manner. 
[* The French word plan, used by the author 
throughout this chapter, covers virtually all the 
meanings of the English ‘plan’ and ‘plane.’ To 
preserve the major contrast that Deleuze sets 
up here, between plan d'immanence ou de 
consistence and plan de transcendance au 
d'organisation, I use ‘plane’ for the first term, 
where the meaning is, roughly, a conceptual-
affective continuum, and ‘plan’ for the second 
term. The reader should also keep in mind that 
‘plan’ has the meaning of ‘map’ in English as 
well. [trans. note]]” (Deleuze 1988, 122–123)  
“It should be clear that the plane of 
immanence, the plane of Nature that 
distributes affects, does not make any 
distinction at all between things that might be 
called natural and things that might be called 
artificial. Artifice is fully a part of Nature, since 
each thing, on the immanent plane of Nature, 
is defined by the arrangements of motions and 
affects into which it enters, whether these 
arrangements are artificial or natural.” 
(Deleuze 1988, 124) 
 
665 PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 3 (3) (2017) 
“Spinoza’s ethics has nothing to do with a 
morality; he conceives it as an ethology, that is, 
as a composition of fast and slow speeds, of 
capacities for affecting and being affected on 
this plane of immanence. That is why Spinoza 
calls out to us in the way he does: you do not 
know beforehand what good or bad you are 
capable of; you do not know beforehand what 
a body or a mind can do, in a given encounter, 
a given arrangement, a given combination.” 
(Deleuze 1988, 125) 
A.L.: Can’t help it, my body and mind are feeling 
slow tonight. Only hope things will run 
smoothly tomorrow, hope the adrenalin kicks 
in, and I can keep up... 
S.V.G.: “There are two very contrary 
conceptions of the word ‘plan,’ or of the idea of 
a plan, even if these two conceptions blend into 
one another and we go from one to the other 
imperceptibly. Any organization that comes 
from above and refers to a transcendence, be 
it a hidden one, can be called a theological plan: 
a design in the mind of a god, but also an 
evolution in the supposed depths of nature, or 
a society's organization of power. A plan of this 
type can be structural or genetic, and both at 
the same time. It always involves forms and 
their developments, subjects and their 
formations. Development of forms and 
formation of subjects: this is the basic feature 
of this first type of plan. Thus, it is a plan of 
organization or development. Whatever one 
may say, then, it will always be a plan of 
transcendence that directs forms as well as 
subjects, and that stays hidden, that is never 
given, that can only be divined, induced, 
inferred from what it gives. It always has an 
additional dimension; it always implies a 
dimension supplementary to the dimensions 
of the given.  
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On the contrary, a plane of immanence has no 
supplementary dimension; the process of 
composition must be apprehended for itself, 
through that which it gives, in that which it 
gives. It is a plan of composition, not a plan of 
organization or development.” (Deleuze 1988, 
128) 
A.L.: But how to cut into this language? How to 
translate it into something that can be shared 
and negotiated? I can’t help feeling a potential 
fundamentalism at play—is this something we 
need to be wary of? Is it something we could 
begin to discuss here? I could play devil’s 
advocate, just to test the waters… 
S.V.G.: “There is no longer a subject, but only 
individuating affective states of an anonymous 
force. Here the plan is concerned only with 
motions and rests, with dynamic affective 
charges. It will be perceived with that which it 
makes perceptible to us, as we proceed. We do 
not live or think or write in the same way on 
both plans. For example, Goethe, and even 
Hegel in certain respects, have been 
considered Spinozists, but they are not really 
Spinozists, because they never ceased to link 
the plan to the organization of a Form and to 
the formation of a Subject. The Spinozists are 
rather Hölderlin, Kleist, and Nietzsche, because 
they think in terms of speeds and slownesses, 
of frozen catatonias and accelerated 
movements, unformed elements, 
nonsubjectified affects.” (Deleuze 1988, 128–
129) 
A.L.: Hang on a minute, if you will. Let’s take this 
one step at a time, shall we? (But does it even 
make sense to speak of ‘steps’ if we’re not really 
going anywhere, at least not in a teleological 
sense. Here’s a question: Can there be, is there 
room for the concept of teleology within 
immanence?) 
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2. Immanence in Spinoza  
S.V.G.: “The mind can imagine nothing, nor can 
it recollect past things, except whilst the body 
endures. Demonstration. The mind does not 
express the actual existence of its body, nor 
again does it conceive as actual the affections 
of the body, except whilst the body endures. 
[…] Consequently […], it conceives no body as 
actually existing except whilst its body endures, 
and therefore it can imagine nothing […], nor 
can it recollect past things, except whilst the 
body endures […].” (Spinoza 2000, 302 [book 5, 
prop. 21]) 
“For no one so far has had such an accurate 
knowledge of the structure of the body that he 
can explain all its functions; to say nothing of 
the many things that are observed in the lower 
animals which far exceed human sagacity, and 
of the fact that sleepwalkers do many things in 
their sleep that they would not dare to do 
whilst awake. This shows sufficiently that the 
body can, by virtue of the laws of its own nature, 
do many things at which its mind is astonished.” 
(Spinoza 2000, 167 [book 3, prop. 2, schol.]) 
A.L.: “…except whilst the body endures.” And 
what does it take, or what language would it 
need, for us to hear, I mean to really hear the 
message in those words? And do we have the 
courage to take them in and to respond? And 
how would it change our every day choices of 
action? Do we have what it takes, to not just 
“philosophize”, but, in clandestine moments 
perhaps, to truly acknowledge and share this 
mortality? For none of this, here, none of this 
reading, writing, dwelling, thinking together, 
instituting, none of this is… “except whilst the 
body endures”.  
(Really? [she whispers] Are you sure? In those 
clandestine moments, are you sure?) 
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S.V.G.: “The intellectual love of the mind for 
God is the love by which God loves himself; not 
in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he can 
be explained through the essence of the 
human mind, considered under a species of 
eternity; that is, the love of the mind for God is 
a part of the infinite intellectual love with which 
God loves himself.” (Spinoza 2000, 310 [book 5, 
prop. 36]) 
A.L.: I wonder, has the study of immanence 
perhaps not so much done away with the idea 
of God as expanded, broadened, flattened, but 
how should I put it, in a good sense, 
“neutralized” the scope of the divine? Is this 
something we are apt to acknowledge, we 
here, in this collective, in this context, despite 
not being theologians and without betraying 
our…, well our European heritage?   
S.V.G.: “This idea which expresses the essence 
of the body under a species of eternity is, as we 
have said, a certain mode of thinking which 
belongs to the essence of the mind, and which 
is necessarily eternal.” (Spinoza 2000, 303 
[book 5, prop. 23, schol.]) 
A.L.: [loud] I KNEW we would have to return to 
the idea of Time! (Didn’t I say so?). Here is as 
good a place as any. I don’t mean to trivialize, 
and, Elisabeth, you are familiar by now with my 
naivety… but does immanence even allow for 
time? Or stated otherwise: Isn’t the very 
experience of time, the sense of before and 
after, of chains of events, of consequences, in 
other words, of narrative—not to mention 
drama—isn’t the very experience of time, that 
which leads to notions of beyond (dare I say 
transcendence)? Can we conceive of 
temporality whilst holding on to, being in 
immanence? Or does the practice of 
immanence (a funny way to put it, I admit, but 
there’s something in it), does the practice of 
immanence somehow go hand in hand with an 
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experience of the dissolution of time? (You 
know the jargon of here and now, in yoga, in 
meditation blabla). But where do we stand, we 
the so-called philosophers of immanence, in 
relation to the practice of here and now? Can 
we put our money where our mouths are? Do 
we dare to philosophize off the cuff, with no 
agenda, just for the fun of it? And what would 
have to have gone down beforehand, in terms 
of preparation, of rehearsal, for this to become 
a worthy experience? What kind of audience 
would be so generous as to find it interesting? 
Or am I mixing my planes again?  Again, I don’t 
mean to provoke just for the sake of it, I swear, 
I really don’t! 
S.V.G.: “The highest endeavour of the mind, 
and its highest virtue, is to understand things 
by the third kind of knowledge. Demonstration. 
The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an 
adequate idea of some of the attributes of God 
to an adequate knowledge of the essence of 
[particular, addition A. B.] things.” (Spinoza 
2000, 304 [book 5, prop. 25]) 
A.L.: So could it be that, for Spinoza, as we 
progress (if that is indeed what happens), we 
move from the positing, the saying of God, to 
the showing, the demonstrating of things, i.e., 
of particular things? But which particular 
things? Any things? I can’t help but be reminded 
here of Agamben’s announcement at the 
opening of the Coming Community: “The coming 
being is whatever being” (Agamben 2009, 1). 
This sentence has become something of a 
mantra to me. I love the enigma of it. It’s so 
pregnant with potential. What is this “coming 
being”? A future being? Is it ever expected to 
arrive? Is it always only but anticipated? Godot? 
And if its identity is truly indifferent—anything, 
whatever, “beliebiges sein”—what is there to 
love of it? Or to love in it? What justifies the liebe 
in beliebig…? I sense a secret here, perhaps it 
holds the key to unraveling some of my many 
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questions. Like can there be an ethics of 
immanence if the plane of immanence is truly 
neutral; a democracy of things, flat ontology… 
can there be an ethics of indifference? What 
might be the basis from which we can call 
welcome—willkommen heißen—whatever being? 
3. Immanence in Agamben 
S.V.G.: “The principle of immanence, therefore, 
is nothing other than a generalization of the 
ontology of univocity, which excludes any 
transcendence of Being. Yet through Spinoza’s 
idea of an immanent cause in which agent and 
patient coincide, Being is freed from the risk of 
inertia and immobility with which the 
absolutization of univocity threatened it by 
making Being equal to itself in its every point.” 
(Agamben 1999, 226) 
“Immanence flows forth; it always, so to speak, 
carries a colon with it. Yet this springing forth, 
far from leaving itself, remains incessantly and 
vertiginously within itself. This is why Deleuze 
can state—with an expression that shows his 
full awareness of the decisive position that 
immanence would later assume his thought—
that ‘immanence is the very vertigo of 
philosophy.’” (Agamben 1999, 226) 
A.L.: Deleuze… Well isn’t that just like him? 
Having flattened things out to the point of 
making you dizzy…. Come to think of it, 
perhaps that is the essence of vertigo. Funny, I 
always thought the feeling was caused by the 
sense of being up above, by the fear of heights, 
fear of what it might mean to fall; but no, now I 
realize, it’s just the looking down that makes 
everything look flat, and that’s what the 
stomach can’t take. It’s the flatness that causes 
the vertigo, the sense that everything is equal 
and relative, the sense that it’s all a diagram; 
the loss, or rather acquisition of perspective. 
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Gosh, how terrible it must have felt to have 
been God! 
S.V.G.: “Among the works of Spinoza that have 
been preserved, there is only one passage in 
which he makes use of the mother tongue of 
Sephardi Jews, Ladino. It is a passage in the 
Compendium grammatices linguae hebraeae in 
which the philosopher explains the meaning of 
the reflexive active verb as an expression of an 
immanent cause, that is, of an action in which 
agent and patient are one and the same 
person.” (Agamben 1999, 234) 
A.L.: Je me promène. I walk myself. 
Je me lève. I get myself up. 
Je m’appelle Alice Mary. I call myself Alice Mary. 
Ich langeweile mich. I bore myself. 
Ich erkälte mich. I make myself cold. 
S.V.G.: [On Immanence: A life…]: “In this sense, 
the colon represents the dislocation of 
immanence in itself, the opening to an alterity 
that nevertheless remains absolutely 
immanent: that is, the movement that Deleuze, 
playing on Neoplatonic emanation, calls 
immanation.” (Agamben 1999, 223) 
A.L.: It’s an ominous word though, immanation, 
don’t you think? Resonates with immolation, 
leading to another transitive verb… 
4. Immanence in Bergson 
S.V.G.: In The Creative Mind, Bergson suggests 
that to understand a text, we “[…] must fall into 
step with him [the author] by adopting his 
gestures, his attitudes, his gait, by which I mean 
learning to read the text aloud with the proper 
intonation and inflection. The intelligence will 
later add shades of meaning. Before 
intellection properly so-called, there is the 
perception of structure and movement; there 
is, on the page one reads, punctuation and 
rhythm. Now it is in indicating this structure 
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and rhythm, in taking into consideration the 
temporal relations between the various 
sentences of the paragraph and the various 
parts of each sentence, in following 
uninterruptedly the crescendo of thought and 
feeling to the point musically indicated as the 
culminating point that the art of diction 
consists […]. One knows, one understands only 
what one can in some measure reinvent.” 
(Bergson 2007, 68–69) 
A.L.: One knows, one understands only what 
one can in some measure re-invent. The 
intelligence will later add shades of meaning. 
5. Immanence in Laruelle 
S.V.G.: “We call ‘posture’ the generic a priori 
dimension of Man. Position and posture are 
two different ways to take or be a decision. 
Man is a postural being rather than a positional 
reason, position indicating an act of 
transcendence by which he would depart from 
himself. Phenomenologically, posture seems 
to be more subjective and global than position, 
and, from this point of view, the term ‘generic’ 
suits the former. It is certainly more real than 
position—which is always divided and in 
opposition with others—because posture is 
immanence before all decision” (Laruelle 2008, 
117–120).1 
A.L.: This reminds me of Roland Barthes’ 
lamentation when it comes to the terror of 
being asked questions. Like when you’re asked 
to state your opinion, your position on this or 
that, especially in small-talk at a party. How 
exhausting it is, he says, to be required to hold 
a position. How delightful, by contrast, the 
dream of being allowed to float… So, are we 
allowed to float? 
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6. Immanence in Artaud  
S.V.G.: “Existence itself is one idea too many 
and little by little, softly and brutally, 
philosophers, savants, doctors and priests are 
making this life false for us. Really, things are 
without profundity, there is no beyond or 
hereafter and no other abyss than this one into 
which one is put.” (Artaud, cited after Dale 
2001, 127) 
A.L.: Cheer up folks! Don’t let the buggers get 
you down! After exhaustion, comes sleep, after 
sleep and a good hot drink, comes readiness. 
Indeed, I would like for us to talk about being 
ready, to think about what it takes, and about 
what we are ready for now. Are we prepared 
for what is to come? 
7. Immanence in Nietzsche  
S.V.G.: “As long as there are philosophers on 
earth, and wherever there have been 
philosophers (from India to England, to take 
the antithetical poles of philosophical 
endowment), there unquestionably exists a 
peculiar philosophers’ irritation at and rancor 
against sensuality: Schopenhauer is merely its 
most eloquent and, if one has ears for this, 
most ravishing and delightful expression. 
There also exists a peculiar philosophers’ 
prejudice and affection in favor of the whole 
ascetic ideal; one should not overlook that. 
Both, to repeat, pertain to the type; if both are 
lacking in a philosopher, then—one can be sure 
of it—he is always only a ‘so-called’ 
philosopher.” (Nietzsche 1989, 106–107) 
A.L.: To be a philosopher, in Nietzsche’s eyes, 
one must refute sensuousness, deny the body 
and embrace asceticism. His appeal, of course, 
is for a new kind a philosopher to come, one 
that would be more in tune with the body, 
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more attentive to its inherent wisdom. So, my 
friends, dare I ask? Where do we stand, we here 
now, on this topic of asceticism? Where do we 
stand in relation to the body?  
S.V.G.: “Ascetic ideals reveal so many bridges to 
independence that a philosopher is bound to 
rejoice and clap his hands when he hears the 
story of all those resolute men who one day 
said No to all servitude and went into some 
desert: even supposing they were merely 
strong asses and quite the reverse of a strong 
spirit. What, then, is the meaning of the ascetic 
ideal in the case of a philosopher? My answer 
is—[…] he does not deny ‘existence,’ he rather 
affirms his existence and only his existence, 
and this perhaps to the point at which he is not 
far from harboring the impious wish: pereat 
mundus, fiat philosphia, fiat phiosophus, fiam! 
[let the world perish, but let philosophy exist, 
let the philosopher exist, let me exist!]” 
(Nietzsche 1989, 107–108) 
A.L.: [let the world perish, but let philosophy 
exist, let the philosopher exist, let me exist!] 
Gathered here, as performance philosophers, 
do we recognize ourselves in this, do we 
ascribe to or see ourselves responding to this 
imperative? In the passion and drive to carry 
out our work—sometimes at great cost to our 
own health, not to mention the wellbeing of 
others. And when we do attune to the body, 
how much attention do we give it? How well do 
we listen to it? Sometimes I wonder… what 
would happen if we entertained the idea that 
our intellectual work was not a priority in our 
lives? If the chiastic law of paradox that we so 
often encounter in these realms (where for 
instance the ‘inner’ world discloses itself as 
actually, unexpectedly corresponding to an 
‘outer’ realm and vice versa), if this paradox 
testifies to a manifest truth, should we not 
prepare to lighten our attitude—precisely 
because we take the work seriously? Throw the 
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paper to the wind, let go of the burden of 
sense-making, I just wonder sometimes… 
S.V.G.: “Only now that we behold the ascetic 
priest do we seriously come to grips with our 
problem: what is the meaning of the ascetic 
ideal?—only now does it become ‘serious’: we 
are now face to face with the actual 
representative of seriousness. ‘What is the 
meaning of all seriousness?’—this even more 
fundamental question may perhaps be 
trembling on our lips at this point: a question 
for physiologists, of course, but one which we 
must still avoid for the moment. The ascetic 
priest possessed in this ideal not only his faith 
but also his will, his power, his interest. His right 
to exist stands or falls with that ideal: no 
wonder we encounter here a terrible 
antagonist—supposing we are antagonists of 
that ideal—one who fights for his existence 
against those who deny that ideal.” (Nietzsche 
1989, 116) 
“The idea at issue here is the valuation the 
ascetic priest places on our life: he juxtaposes 
it (along with what pertains to it: ‘nature,’ 
‘world,’ the whole sphere of becoming and 
transitoriness) with a quite different mode of 
existence which it opposes and excludes, 
unless it turn against itself, deny itself: in that 
case, the case of the ascetic life, life counts as a 
bridge to that other mode of existence. The 
ascetic treats life as a wrong road on which one 
must finally walk back to the point where it 
begins, or as a mistake that is put right by 
deeds—that we ought to put right: for he 
demands that one go along with him […].” 
(Nietzsche 1989, 117) 
“Read from a distant star, the majuscule script 
of our earthly existence would perhaps lead to 
the conclusion that the earth was the 
distinctively ascetic planet, a nook of 
disgruntled, arrogant, and offensive creatures 
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filled with a profound disgust at themselves, at 
the earth, at all life, who inflict as much pain on 
themselves as they possibly can out of 
pleasure in inflicting pain—which is probably 
their only pleasure. For consider how regularly 
and universally the ascetic priest appears in 
almost every age; he belongs to no one race; 
he prospers everywhere; he emerges from 
every class of society. […] It must be a necessity 
of the first order that again and again 
promotes the growth and prosperity of this life-
inimical species—it must indeed be in the 
interest of life itself that such a self-
contradictory type does not die out. For an 
ascetic life is a self-contradiction: here rules a 
ressentiment without equal, that of an 
insatiable instinct and power-will that wants to 
become master not over something in life but 
over life itself, over its most profound, 
powerful, and basic conditions; here an 
attempt is made to employ force to block up 
the wells of force; here physiological well-being 
itself is viewed askance, and especially the 
outward expression of this well-being, beauty 
and joy; while pleasure is felt and sought in ill-
constitutedness, decay, pain, mischance, 
ugliness, voluntary deprivation, self-
mortification, self-flagellation, self-sacrifice. All 
this is in the highest degree paradoxical: we 
stand before a discord that wants to be 
discordant, that enjoys itself in this suffering 
and even grows more self-confident and 
triumphant the more its own presupposition, 
its physiological capacity for life, decreases. 
‘Triumph in the ultimate agony’: the ascetic 
ideal has always fought under this hyperbolic 
sign; in this enigma of seduction, in this image 
of torment and delight, it recognized its 
brightest light, its salvation, its ultimate victory. 
Crux, nux, lux—for the ascetic ideal these three 
are one.—“ (Nietzsche 1989, 117–118) 
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A.L.: “I have kept a close eye on the 
philosophers and read between their lines for 
long enough to say to myself: the greatest part 
of conscious thought must still be attributed to 
instinctive activity, and this is even the case for 
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